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AN UNCONSCIONABLE APPLICATION
OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY
DOCTRINE:
HOW THE CALIFORNIA COURTS ARE
CIRCUMVENTING THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
Stephen A. Broome*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court stated in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation that the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)' "is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary."2 Subsequent decisions of the Court
clearly provide that mutually agreed-upon arbitration agreements must be
afforded the same judicial deference as ordinary contractual provisions.3
While in most jurisdictions the judiciary has long abandoned its historical
hostility to arbitration as an alternative to litigation, deferring to the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the FAA and in fact even
welcoming arbitration as a practical auxiliary to the judicial system, in
California the courts continue to view arbitration agreements critically.
Under the unique approach adopted in California, the courts have refused
Law clerk, The Honorable Richard C. Wesley, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, 2006-07 Term. J.D., 2006, The George Washington University Law School. M.Sc., 2003, The
London School of Economics. B.A., 2002, The University of British Columbia. The author thanks
Luize E. Zubrow, Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School, for her
thoughtful comments during the preparation of this Article. Any mistakes are my own. This Article is
dedicated to Jennifer Greenberg.
I. Pub. L. No. 401,43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
2. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (stating that state law may be applied to
arbitration agreements only "if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally"); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Cassarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87
(1996).
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to enforce multitudes of arbitration agreements. Although ostensibly
applying the "generally applicable" contract defense of unconscionability,4
in cases involving the validity of arbitration agreements the California
courts routinely apply an entirely different test, requiring less of parties
seeking to avoid arbitration.
This Article examines the California courts' unconscionability
jurisprudence, highlighting the disparate application of unconscionability
doctrine in cases involving arbitration agreements as contrasted with cases
involving "ordinary" contracts. Part II provides an historical background in
order to give context to the analyses and arguments that follow. An
empirical analysis in Part III reveals that unconscionability challenges
before the California appellate courts succeed with far greater frequency
when the contractual provision at issue is an arbitration agreement.
Part IV provides a substantive analysis of the California appellate
courts' unconscionability decisions. The unconscionability test comprises
two prongs-one testing substantive unconscionability and the other testing
procedural unconscionability. Parts IV.A and IV.B provide analyses of the
California courts' substantive and procedural unconscionability
jurisprudence, respectively. Part 1V.A explains that the California courts
routinely employ the "mutuality test," a unique substantive
unconscionability test, when the disputed term is an arbitration provision.5
The mutuality test evidences an overt bias against arbitration by the
California courts, as the test begins with the premise that arbitration is
inferior to litigation as a method of dispute resolution.6 In addition, Part
IV.A discusses how the mutuality test provides a basis for
unconscionability that is entirely different in kind from the basis for
unconscionability findings outside of the arbitration context. In the non-
arbitration context the basis for an unconscionability finding is invariably
the appropriation by the party with superior bargaining power of something
of measurable value, unjustified by any legitimate business purpose. In
contrast, under the mutuality test the California courts frequently void
arbitration agreements as unconscionable on the basis of speculative
disadvantages to the party required to arbitrate its claim.
The procedural unconscionability analysis in Part IV.B reveals that the
4. Section two of the FAA provides that courts may not restrict the enforceability of arbitration
agreements, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
5. The terms "arbitration setting" or "arbitration context" refer to cases where the validity of an
arbitration agreement is at issue before a court. The terms "non-arbitration context" or "non-arbitration
setting" refer to cases where the validity of a contractual term other than an arbitration agreement is
being challenged before a court.
6. See Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California 's "Unique" Approach to Arbitration:
Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the
FederalArbitration Act, 2005 J. DIsP. RESOL. 61, 81 (2005).
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courts impose a lower burden for plaintiffs attempting to demonstrate
procedural unconscionability in the arbitration setting. In the non-
arbitration context, plaintiffs claiming that a standardized form contract is
procedurally unconscionable generally have to demonstrate that they
sought to negotiate the disputed terms but were rebuffed and/or that they
could not obtain the necessary products, services or employment
elsewhere. By contrast, the courts have said that arbitration provisions in
standardized form contracts are procedurally unconscionable per se.
The Article concludes that the California courts are clearly biased
against arbitration as an alternative means of dispute settlement. Their
disdain manifests in unique unconscionability requirements applicable
solely when arbitration agreements are at issue and in lower standards for
demonstrating unconscionability in the arbitration context. It is therefore
evident that California's unconscionability jurisprudence violates the basic
mandate of the FAA that arbitration agreements be placed on equal footing
with ordinary contractual provisions.7
II. BACKGROUND
The proliferation of arbitration agreements in employment and
commercial contracts has increased exponentially over the past century as
employers and businesses, intent on avoiding the judicial system for
resolving disputes, have incorporated arbitration clauses into virtually all of
their standardized form contracts. 8 Businesses understand arbitration to be
faster and less costly than litigation. The speed and cost savings of
arbitration derive from a focus on early resolution of the dispute, less
formal procedures (arbitrations generally dispense with formal pleading
rules and most pre-trial motions), and simplified discovery.9 In addition,
repeated use of an arbitral forum generates institutional knowledge over a
particular subject matter and enhances the forum's ability to resolve a
company's disputes as efficiently as possible.
Critics of arbitration, in contrast, argue that arbitration agreements
often are imposed on consumers and employees by businesses and
7. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (In enacting the FAA, Congress sought to place arbitration
agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] belong.").
8. Jon 0. Shimabukuro, The Federal Arbitration Act: Background and Recent Developments 1 (June
17, 2002) (Unpublished Manuscript, available at http://www.thememoryhole.org/crs/RL30934.pdf).
9. See generally Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 29, 55 (1998). Maltby's study compared employment claims filed with the
American Arbitration Association with similar claims filed in federal court. He found that, on average,
arbitration cases were concluded in about half the time of litigation. Pierce writes that the informal
nature of the arbitration process "enhances the behavior of courtroom participants.... [and] diminishes
the adversarial nature of dispute resolution by encouraging arbitrating parties to work closely together
in an effort to seek common solutions." David P. Pierce, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting
Interpretations of its Scope, 61 U. CtN. L. REV. 623, 625 (1992).
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employers who are generally in a superior bargaining position; the alleged
goal of the businesses and employers is to prevent these potential plaintiffs
from enjoying the purported advantages of litigation, such as the right to
conduct extensive discovery, the right to a jury trial, the possibility of
instituting a class action lawsuit and the right to appeal.' °
Until the early-twentieth-century, judges frequently were persuaded
that arbitration agreements, despite being formalized in written and valid
contracts, should nevertheless be disregarded. "In many jurisdictions,
courts once viewed agreements to arbitrate as a 'lesser caste' of contract
provisions that could be ignored with impunity."" In fact, a review of pre-
twentieth-century jurisprudence indicates that the voiding of arbitration
agreements was routine. 2 This judicial hostility resulted in part from
courts' reluctance to surrender jurisdiction in cases that would otherwise be
before them,'3 and in part because of judges' paternalistic attitude that only
they could ensure that individual plaintiffs would be afforded a fair
opportunity to challenge corporate defendants. 4
By the turn of the century, however, growing industrialization and the
accompanying increase in the frequency of labor and business disputes
changed the general attitude of the judiciary. 5 Arbitration came to be seen
as a system of adjudication built, like the public justice system, on the
foundation of fundamental fairness. 16 Judges came to accept arbitration as
a welcome supplement to the overworked judicial system. 7 Congress also
took this view and, in 1925, enacted the FAA, placing arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other valid contractual provisions."
10. Pierce, supra note 9, at 625.
11. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1, 6 (1997).
12. See McGuinness & Karr, supra note 6, at 63.
13. Wigner has suggested that American judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements flowed
from a similar hostility displayed by English courts. English judges were paid fees based on the
number of cases they decided. Arbitration therefore infringed their livelihood. See Preston D. Wigner,
The United States Supreme Court's Expansive Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the
Past, Present, and Future of Section 2, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1995).
14. See generally Petition of Pahlberg, 43 F. Supp. 761, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ("Prior to 1925 there
was no federal legislation on the subject of arbitration and it is an historical fact that our courts,
generally speaking, had not looked with favor upon arbitration agreements. They had never denied that
an agreement to arbitrate created a right but public policy was thought to forbid specific performance."),
appeal dismissed, 131 F.2d 968 (1942).
15. John C. Norling, The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's Preemption Power: An Examination
of the Import of Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 139, 140-41
(1991).
16. Stipanowich, supra note 11, at 6.
17. Id.
18. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (In enacting the FAA, Congress sought to place arbitration
agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] belong.").
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Section 2 of the FAA makes "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" 9
written arbitration provisions in commercial transactions,2" "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."'2' In
essence, section 2 serves as an equal protection clause for arbitration
provisions, ensuring that arbitration clauses are subject to the same
principles of contract law as ordinary contractual provisions. The Supreme
Court has interpreted the language of the FAA broadly, 22 and subsequent
lower court decisions demonstrate that section 2 requires courts, in most
circumstances, to enforce arbitration agreements irrespective of context, be
it an employee action against an employer,23 a consumer product dispute,24
a franchise dispute,25 a dispute between a bank and its customer,26 or an
investor action under the securities laws. 27  The Court has also clearly
stated that the FAA applies in state courts and preempts any conflicting
state law.28
With respect to the so-called "savings clause" of section 2, the Court
has noted that state law may be applied to arbitration agreements only if
that law was intended to govern issues concerning the enforceability of
contracts generally.29 The Court warned that section 2 precludes courts
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
20. The FAA also applies to "maritime transaction[s]," but such transactions are outside the scope of
this Article. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
21. Id.
22. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the Court determined the
FAA to be a source of substantive federal law governing arbitrability issues under any agreement within
its coverage. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The Court declared that the FAA superceded contrary "state
substantive or procedural policies" concerning arbitrability and applied in state as well as federal courts.
The Court also stated that doubts concerning arbitrability are to be resolved in favor of arbitration. Id.
See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11, 16 (1984) (mandating arbitration of claims under a
state franchise investment statute, reasoning that the FAA preempted provisions of the statute that
required judicial resolution of claims).
23. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447, 1463 (D. Minn. 1996) (enforcing
agreement to arbitrate in employment contract with respect to claims and disputes governed by ERISA
and state and local antidiscrimination laws and ordinances).
24. See, e.g., ProCD Inc. v. Ziedenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1445 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that terms
inside box of software bind customers who use software after foregoing opportunity to read the terms
and reject them by returning the software).
25. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (holding franchisee-
franchisor arbitration agreement could not be rendered unenforceable under the FAA based on Montana
statute discriminating against arbitration agreements).
26. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F. 3d 868, 883 (1 1th Cir. 2005)
(enforcing arbitration agreement between bank and borrower).
27. See, e.g., Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) (denying
a public policy defense to customer-broker arbitration agreements); Secs. Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883
F.2d 1114, 1125 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that FAA policy favoring arbitration superceded a
Massachusetts statute limiting the use and effect of predispute arbitration clauses in customer-broker
contracts), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990).
28. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
29. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 686-87 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9
(1987)).
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from invalidating arbitration agreements under state laws that are
applicable solely to arbitration provisions.30  Thus, courts may apply
generally applicable contract defenses-such as fraud, duress or
unconscionability-but may not void arbitration agreements pursuant to
statutory or judge-made laws that govern only arbitration provisions.3'
Absent a generally applicable contract defense, privately negotiated
agreements to arbitrate, like ordinary contracts, must be enforced in
accordance with their terms.32
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This empirical study collects all cases in the California Courts of
Appeal (the intermediate appellate courts in California) that involved
analysis of an unconscionability challenge to a contractual provision.3  The
study reveals that unconscionability challenges succeed more frequently
when the contractual provision at issue is an arbitration agreement. A
Westlaw search revealed 114 cases in which the California Courts of
Appeal analyzed whether the terms of an arbitration agreement were
unconscionable. 34  In fifty-three of those cases the arbitration agreement
was held to be unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. 35  In an
30. Id. at 687; see also Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 ("A state-law principle that takes its meaning
precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of §
2.").
31. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 687.
32. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,478 (1989).
33. The study reviewed all Court of Appeal cases decided between August 27, 1982 and January 26,
2006. The significance of August 27, 1982, is that it marks the introduction of the modem
unconscionability test to California. Under the modem test, a determination that an agreement is
unconscionable rests on findings of both substantive and procedural unconscionability. In A&M
Produce v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (1982), the Court of Appeal established the two
pronged unconscionability analysis as precedent in California, citing, inter alia, the landmark
unconscionability case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The surge in unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements occurred after the introduction of
the modem test. In order to permit an apples-to-apples comparison (i.e. comparing substantive
unconscionability jurisprudence in the arbitration and non-arbitration contexts, and then comparing
procedural unconscionability jurisprudence in the arbitration and non-arbitration contexts), the period
before A &M Produce is excluded from this study.
34. See infra notes 35, 36 and 37.
35. Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 134 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1300 (2005); Rocha v. Cent. Valley
RV Outlet, Inc., No. F046584, 2005 WL 3219728, at *25 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2005); Aral v.
Earthlink, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 4th 544, 563 (2005); Wing v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. A105906,
2005 WL 2417640, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2005); Vlahos v. Int'l Baking Co., No. 102335, 2005
WL 1632089, at *8-9 (Cal. Ct. App. July 12, 2005); McLemore v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No.
A106373, 2005 WL 1634981, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 13, 2005); Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,
No. A105518, 2005 WL 2420719, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2005); Meoli v. AT&T Wireless Servs.,
Inc., No. A106061, 2005 WL 2404427, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2005); Coleman v. Zenodata
Corp., No. G032443, 2004 WL 2202027, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2004); Fotheringham v. Avery
Dennison Corp., No. B162762, 2004 WL 1240401, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2004); Fitz v. NCR
Corp., 118 Cal. App. 4th 702, 728 (2004); Jovich v. Green Hills Software, Inc., No. H026539, 2004 WL
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additional thirteen cases a particular aspect of the arbitration agreement
was held to be unconscionable and severed from the arbitration agreement,
while the remainder of the arbitration agreement was enforced.16 In forty-
2113277, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2004); Chin v. Dollar Fin. Group, No. B172743, 2004 WL
2039794, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2004); Gonlugar v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. G033351,
2004 WL 1946446, *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2004); Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal.
App. 4th 638, 668 (2004); Longway v. AutoNation, Inc., No. G031934, 2004 WL 206602, at *4-5 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2004); Hawley-McGrath v. Gen. Trailer Park Assocs., No. B173970, 2004 WL
2537594, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2004); Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., 118 Cal. App. 4th
107, 119 (2004); United Revenue Serv., Inc. v. Prall, No. G032279, 2004 WL 723219, at *6 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 5, 2004); Whalen-Camacho v. GMRI, Inc., No. H031367, 2004 WL 569256, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 23, 2004); Bowen v. Linuxcare, Inc., No. A102256, 2004 WL 363497, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 27, 2004); Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 120 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1288 (2004); Castillo v.
Dollar Financial Group, No. G033184, 2004 WL 2191551, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept, 30, 2004); Harper
v. Ultimo, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1412 (2003); Harvey v. Katella Mobilehome Estates, L.P., No.
G031737, 2003 WL 22436265, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2003); Ho v. Knox Assocs., Inc., No.
G030477, 2003 WL 22422391, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2003); Torigian v. Michael Cadillac, Inc.,
No. F039900, 2003 WL 21246609, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 29, 2003); Pitzen v. Veritas Software
Corp., No. A100181, 2003 WL 22026623, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003); Jaramillo v. JH Real
Estate Partners, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 4th 394, 406 (2003); Wilson v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., No.
D039355, 2003 WL 21398324, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2003); Stone v. Memberworks, Inc., No.
G030740, 2003 WL 21246771, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 30, 2003); O'Hare v. Municipal Res.
Consultants, 107 Cal. App. 4th 267, 284 (2003); Canales v. Performance Team Triangle West, No.
B155659, 2003 WL 361242, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2003); Maciejewski v. Alpha Sys. Lab, Inc.,
No. G021588, 2002 WL 31888782, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2002); Bylund v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., No. B153167, 2002 WL 31744919, *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2002); Martin v. King-
Tek Wire EDM, Inc., No. G028214, 2002 WL 31402077, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2002);
Hausmaninger v. Paychecks, Inc., No. G029772, 2002 WL 1839273, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 12,
2002); McKinney v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., No. B153720, 2002 WL 1824963, at *5 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 8, 2002); Packin v. Astra USA, Inc., No. G023345, 2002 WL 120563, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 2002); Meriwether v. Gemini Assocs., Inc., No. G027921, 2002 WL 1161596, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 31, 2002); Dung v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., No. B 152629, 2002 WL 984800, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 14, 2002); Hendrix v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. B153848, 2002 WL 1584244, at
*4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 17, 2002); Ritchotte v. Nissan, No. B144965, 2002 WL 533219, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 10, 2002); Mercuro v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal. App. 4th 167, 187 (2002); Fischer v. Families For
Children, Inc., No. C037383, 2002 WL 171240, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2002); Flores v.
TransAmerica Homefirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 856-59 (2002); Katherman v. Den 104, L.L.C.,
No. E028869, 2001 WL 1191454, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3,2001); McCoyv. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. App.
4th 354, 363 (2001); Villa Milano Homeowners Ass'n v. II Davorge, 84 Cal. App. 4th 819, 835 (2000);
Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 76 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1237 (2000); Maciejewski v. Alpha Sys.
Lab, Inc., No. G021588, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 396 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1999); Kinney v. United
Healthcare Servs., Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1332 (1999); Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft Employees
Fed. Credit Union, 70 Cal. App. 4th 468, 478 (1999); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519,
1552 (1997).
36. Blosser v. Sheibani, M.D., No. B172402, 2005 WL 906173, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20,
2005); Chong v. Friedman, No. A107716, 2005 WL 2083049, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2005);
Wilkins v. Weber Motors Fresno, Inc., No. F045545, 2005 WL 1941273, *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15,
2005); Scott Robinson Honda v. Lopez, No. B172450, 2005 WL 15433, *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2005);
Marcus v. Trautman Wasserman & Co., No. A104817, 2004 WL 2191332, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
30, 2004); Kozonasky v. Metrociti Mortgage, No. B162389, 2004 WL 798374, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 15, 2004); McManus v. World Mkts. Corp., 109 Cal. App. 4th 76, 102 (2003); Gutierrez v.
Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 77, 101 (2003); Olson v. ARV Assisted Living, Inc., No. D038336,
2002 WL 31174254, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2002); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
eight cases the arbitration agreement was found not to be unconscionable
and the agreement was enforced according to its terms.37
In the non-arbitration context (where an ordinary contractual provision
is at issue), by contrast, the incidence of successful unconscionability
challenges is significantly lower, in both absolute and relative terms. A
1094, 1102 (2002); Blake v. Ecker, 93 Cal. App. 4th 728, 747 (2001); Bolter v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. App.
4th 900, 911 (2001); Shubin v. William Lyon Homes, Inc., 84 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 1063 (2000).
37. Mabrie v. Home Imp. King, No. B178150, 2006 WL 52284, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2006);
Chezek v. Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, Inc., No. B177122, 2005 WL 3163855, at *6 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 29, 2005); Uecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Ernst & Young, No. A109719, 2005 WL 2982254, at
*7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2005); Acosta v. Kerrigan, No. B181678, 2005 WL 2716275, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 24, 2005); Jones v. Humanscale Corp., 130 Cal. App. 4th 401, 417 (2005); Schachle v.
Merrill Lynch, No. G032194, 2005 WL 1822517, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2005); Bugarini v.
Solomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. G031933, 2005 WL 1822529, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2005);
Mitchell v. Sprint Spectrum, Nos. A10591 1, A106591, 2005 WL 1176199, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18,
2005); Elias v. Super. Ct[0]., No. B178379, 2005 WL 605716, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2005);
Auerbach v. Heyman, No. B169437, 2005 WL 78542, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2005); Scrosati v.
McRoy-Wilbur Cmtys., Inc., No. C045375, 2005 WL 590626, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2005);
Cummings v. Future Nissan, 128 Cal. App. 4th 321, 332 (2005); Bucy v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc.,
No. A105910, 2005 WL 1168371, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18, 2005); Semidey v. Airport Marina
Honda, No. B 176252, 2005 WL 668232, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2005); Crippen v. Cent. Valley
RV Outlet, Inc., 124 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1168 (2004); Sossamon v. Cent. Valley RV Outlet, Inc., No.
F043318, 2004 WL 1418733, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. June 25, 2004); Bennett v. Peters, No. B165610,
2004 WL 1398542, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2004); Weathersby v. Quisic Corp., No. B166191,
2004 WL 1172663, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 27, 2004); Crumb v. APC Tech., Inc., No. B171802, 2005
WL 67113, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005); Camilo Lopez, Inc. v. Sialic Contractors Corp., No.
B170164, 2005 WL 67111, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005); County of Solano v. Lionsgate Corp.,
126 Cal. App. 4th 741, 754 (2005); Belinsky v. BPM Goldman Fin. Design, LLC, No. A104645, 2004
WL 2632550, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2004); Reynolds v. One Legal, Inc., No. A106817, 2005
WL 504054, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2005); Haas v. Cent. Valley RV Outlet, Inc., No. F044347,
2005 WL 236444, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2005); Fletcher v. Quest Educ. Corp., No. D041048,
2004 WL 625822, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2004); Winokur v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., No.
B158782, 2004 WL 42904, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2004); Cervantes v. Athens Servs., No.
B166523, 2004 WL 249424, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2004); Vielma v. Exult, Inc., No. B168032,
2004 WL 2181394, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2004); Hicks v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 77, 87
(2004); Morgenstern v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. C042352, 2003 WL 21666636, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jul. 17, 2003); Kim v. Sonic Auto., Inc., No. H024386, 2003 WL 21500750, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 30, 2003); Walker v. lasco, No. A101450, 2003 WL 22300861, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8,
2003); Martinez v. Univision Television Group, No. A100780, 2003 WL 21470103, at *6 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 26, 2003); Dale v. Terminix Int'l Co., No. B162108, 2003 WL 22511633, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 6, 2003); Fittante v. Palm Springs Motors, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 4th 708, 727 (2003); Marzec
v. Arter & Hadden, No. B157849, 2002 WL 31832508, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2002); Simpkins
v. New Century Volkswagen, Nos. B151536, B152944, 2002 WL 31648747, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov.
25, 2002); Stasz v. Quackenbush, No. B147388, 2002 WL 31555352, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19,
2002); Locke v. Raymer, No. G029074, 2002 WL 31025863, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2002);
Swiderski v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, LLP, 94 Cal. App. 4th 719, 753 (2001); Main
Storage & Trucking Co. v. Benco Contracting & Eng'g, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1058 (2001);
Pichly v. Nortech Waste LLC, 87 Cal. App. 4th 599, 615 (2001); Coast Plaza Doctors Hosp. v. Blue
Cross of Cal., 83 Cal. App. 4th 677, 693-94 (2000); Lagatree v. Luce, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1137
(1999); Pichly v. Nortech Waste, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 447, 447 (1999); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Sup.
Ct., 66 Cal. App. 4th 1199, 1215-16 (1998); Spinello v. Amblin Entm't, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1390, 1399
(1994); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 775 (1989).
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Westlaw search revealed forty-six cases in the California Courts of Appeal
where a non-arbitration contractual provision was alleged to be
unconscionable. In forty-one of those cases, the contractual provision was
upheld by the court.38 In only five ordinary contract cases was the
contractual provision held to be unconscionable and unenforceable.39
In other words, when one includes the cases in which a particular
provision of an arbitration agreement was held unconscionable and
38. Card Direct LLC v. First United, Inc., No. D045873, 2006 WL 121034, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 17, 2006); Wayne v. Staples, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 466, 487 (2006); Hwang v. Lee, No.
B172405, 2005 WL 3047529, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2005); Santa Maria Enters., Inc. v. Texaco
Exploration & Prod., No. B161737, 2005 WL 675501, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2005); Toor v.
Wheatland Elementary Sch. Dist., No. C046523, 2005 WL 428775, *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2005);
Trend Homes v. Super. Ct., 131 Cal. App. 4th 950, 956 (2005); Zlatanov v. Bank One, N.A., No.
H025940, 2005 WL 32952, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2005); In re Marriage of Sinclair, No.
E035668, 2005 WL 1595268, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 8, 2005); Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp,
128 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1325 (2005); Johnisee v. Kimberlite Corp., No. A107341, 2005 WL 1249198,
at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24, 2005) (note that the provision challenged in this case was held to be
enforceable in some circumstances, but not in others); AAA 1 RV Ctr., Inc., Nova Info. Sys., Inc., No.
B168213, 2004 WL 2809898, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004); Thomas v. Georgas, No. E034745,
2004 WL 1465831, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2004); Pickens v. Blockbuster, Inc., No. A162626,
2004 WL 339594, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2004); Copelco Capital, Inc. v. Johnson, No. B164376,
2004 WL 1559652, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. July 13, 2004); Greenbriar Homes Cmtys., Inc. v. Super. Ct.,
117 Cal. App. 4th 337, 348 (2004); In re Marriage of Clark, No. F043098, 2004 WL 2011353, at *8
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2004); Eagle High Reach Equip., Inc. v. Precision Drywall, Inc., No. B163833,
2004 WL 938428, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 3, 2004); Contreras v. Children's Hosp. of Los Angeles,
No. B156810, 2003 WL 21328937, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 10[0], 2003); Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank,
112 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1541 (2003); Woodside Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 142 Cal. App. 4th
99, 104 (2003); Max Group Corp. v. Pacific Indus. Partners, No. B158950, 2003 WL 21490979, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2003); Gruber v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, No. B 154703, 2003 WL 1091046,
at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2003); Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 4th 660, 670
(2003); Gary Drilling Co. v. Onesta Corp., No. F038807, 2003 WL 178867, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
27, 2003); Cabral v. YMCA of Redlands, No. E028654, 2002 WL 399480, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
15, 2002); Seibert v. Shapell Indus., Inc., No. B151333, 2002 WL 31521526, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov.
14, 2002); Newell v. Hauschildt, No. C037352, 2002 WL 1068257, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 30,
2002[0]); Robison v. City of Manteca, 78 Cal. App. 4th 452, 461 (2000); Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc.,
51 Cal. App. 4th 1358, 1378 (1996); Olsen v. Breeze, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 4th 608, 629 (1996); Am.
Software Inc. v. Ali, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 1395 (1996); Vance v. Villa Park Mobilehome Estates, 36
Cal. App. 4th 698, 711 (1995); Cal. Grocers Ass'n Inc. v. Bank of Am., 22 Cal. App. 4th 205, 221
(1994); Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1715, 1753 (1993); West v. Henderson, 227 Cal.
App. 3d 1578, 1589 (1991); Winston v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 231 Cal. App. 3d 540, 551 (1991);
Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 1,44 (1989); H.S. Perlin Co., Inc.
v. Morse Signal Devices of San Diego, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1289, 1302 (1989); Nunes v. Vaughan-Jacklin
Seed Co., Inc., 200 Cal. App. 3d 1518, 1540 (1988); Kurashige v. Indian Dunes, Inc., 200 Cal. App. 3d
606, 615 (1988); Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 944 (1983).
39. Johnisee v. Kimberlite Corp., No. A107341, 2005 WL 1249198, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24,
2005) (the provision challenged in this case was held to be enforceable in some circumstances, but not
in others); Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Johnson, No. A089871, 2001 WL 1324778, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
29, 2001); Ilkhchooyi v. Best, 37 Cal. App. 4th 395, 412 (1995); Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co.,
18 Cal. App. 4th 1796, 1807 (1993); Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. App. 4th 76, 87 (1992). There are
some additional cases where marriage contracts were found to be unconscionable under section 1615 of
California's Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which provides specific rules of unconscionability for
premarital agreements. CAL. FAM. CODE. §§ 1600-1617 (2002).
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severed, unconscionability challenges succeeded in about fifty-eight
percent of cases in the arbitration context. In the non-arbitration context,
by contrast, unconscionability challenges succeeded only eleven percent of
the time. Thus, as a purely empirical matter, unconscionability challenges
succeed with far greater frequency when the contractual provision at issue
is an arbitration agreement.
The following table summarizes the outcomes of unconscionability
challenges in the California Courts of Appeal:
Unconscionability Challenges to Contracts Reviewed by California Courts
of Appeal
08/27/1982 - 01/26/2006
Agreement Unconscionable Agreement
Unconscionable Provision Enforceable
Severed
Arbitration 53 (47%) 13 (11%) 48 (42%)
Agreement
Ordinary 5(11%) 0 41(89%)
Contract
Numbers, however, provide only a starting point. The significance of
these numbers might be diminished by positing that arbitration agreements
more frequently include truly unconscionable provisions. As will be
demonstrated below, however, the empirical data are in fact the natural
consequence of the unique standards to which arbitration agreements are
held by the California courts as they apply the unconscionability doctrine.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS
The following Part provides a substantive analysis of the application
of unconscionability doctrine by the California appellate courts in both the
arbitration and non-arbitration contexts. The doctrine of unconscionability
comprises two elements, one substantive and one procedural.4" Substantive
unconscionability focuses on "overly harsh" or "one-sided" results.41
Procedural unconscionability focuses on "oppression" or "surprise"
attributable to unequal bargaining power in the negotiating process.42 Both
elements must be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to
refuse to enforce a contract or clause.43 The elements need not be present
40. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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to the same degree, however.4 4  "Essentially a sliding scale is invoked
which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract
formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or
unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves. '45 Thus, "the more
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is
unenforceable, and vice versa." 6
The substantive and procedural inquiries involve different standards
and requirements. To determine whether the California courts apply
unconscionability doctrine disparately to arbitration agreements, it is
necessary to analyze the courts' treatment of the substantive and procedural
elements separately.
A. SUBSTANTIVE UNCONSCIONABILITY
Section 2 of the FAA provides that written arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. '  The U.S.
Supreme Court has noted that the text of section 2 declares that state law
may be applied "if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally."'4  The Court,
however, cautioned that courts "may not invalidate arbitration agreements
under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions." '49 The Court also
stated that "[a] state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the
fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this
requirement of section 2."'50 Nevertheless, the California Courts of Appeal
routinely strike down arbitration agreements by applying the "mutuality
test"--a unique test applicable only to arbitration agreements.
The mutuality test was first announced as part of California
unconscionability analysis in Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. "' The Court of
Appeal held in that case that an arbitration agreement in a standard
employment contract was unconscionable because it lacked even a
"modicum of bilaterality."52  At issue in Stirlen was an arbitration
agreement that required employees to arbitrate their wrongful termination
claims against the employer but specifically excluded other types of
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1763A (3d ed. 1972)).
46. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114.
47. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
48. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Cassarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996) (emphasis added) (quoting
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 482, 492 n.9 (1987)).
49. Id. (emphasis in original).
50. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
51. 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1547-48 (1997).
52. Id. at 1540.
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disputes-such as those relating to the protection of the employer's
intellectual property and the enforcement of a post-employment covenant
not to compete-from the scope of arbitration.53 The court held that these
exceptions made the agreement "one-sided," and rendered the arbitration
agreement unconscionable and unenforceable. 4 Two years later, in Kinney
v. United Healthcare Services, the Court of Appeal was faced with a
similar arbitration agreement that required the employee, but not the
employer, to submit claims to arbitration.5 The court stated, "Faced with
the issue of whether a unilateral obligation to arbitrate is unconscionable,
we conclude that it is."
56
The California Supreme Court affirmed the mutuality test in
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, where it concluded
that "Stirlen and Kinney are correct in requiring this 'modicum of
bilaterality' in an arbitration agreement."57 The court stated that arbitration
agreements lacking mutuality are unfairly one-sided and therefore
unconscionable absent a "reasonable justification for such one-sidedness
based on 'business realities."' 58 The court supported this conclusion by
discussing the numerous disadvantages arbitration would impose on an
employee pursuing a claim under the Federal Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA) against his employer, and referred to "[v]arious studies [that]
show that arbitration is advantageous to employers."59  Although
Armendariz involved an arbitration provision in an employment contract,
numerous subsequent opinions of the Courts of Appeal have applied the
mutuality requirement to arbitration agreements in a diverse group of
contracts. 60 The mutuality test is now the most common means employed
by the Courts of Appeal to void arbitration agreements: in more than two-
thirds of the Courts of Appeal cases finding arbitration provisions
unconscionable, the basis was lack of mutuality.61
53. Id. at 1527-30.
54. Id. at 1549-50.
55. 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1330-31 (1999).
56. Id.
57. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Sen's., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 117 (2000).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 115 (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 33, 60-
61(1997)).
60. E.g., Meoli v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., Nos. A106061, A106340, A106341, 2005 WL
2404427, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2005) (applying mutuality requirement to arbitration provision
in a cellular phone service agreement); Bucy v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., No. A105910, 2005 WL
1168371, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 15, 2005) (cell-phone service agreement); Torigian v. Michael
Cadillac, Inc., No. F039900, 2003 WL 21246609, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 29, 2003) (applying
mutuality requirement to arbitration provision in automobile sales contract); Flores v. TransAmerica
Homefirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 858 (2002) (applying mutuality requirement to loan agreement).
61. Rocha v. Cent. Valley RV Outlet, Inc., No. F046584, 2005 WL 3219728, at *25 (Cal. Ct. App.
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Other jurisdictions have refused to adopt a requirement of mutuality
for arbitration agreements.62 The Alabama Supreme Court rejected a
mutuality requirement, stating that such an approach relies on the
"uniqueness of the concept of arbitration," "assigns a suspect status to
arbitration agreements," and therefore "flies in the face of [the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in] Doctor's Associates. 63  Another court
similarly held that "lack of mutuality arising from the fact that Defendants
may go to court while Plaintiffs must arbitrate does not render the clause
unconscionable." 64 Two arguments support this conclusion. First, general
principles of contract law provide that a non-mutual contract is valid "so
Dec. 1, 2005); Fotheringham v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. B162762, 2004 WL 1240401, at *5-6 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 7, 2004); Fitz v. NCR Corp., 118 Cal. App. 4th 702, 728 (2004); Jovich v. Green Hills
Software, Inc., No. H026539, 2004 WL 2113277, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2004); Chin v. Dollar
Fin. Group, No. B172743, 2004 WL 2039794, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2004); Gonlugar v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. G033351, 2004 WL 1946446, *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2004);
Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 668 (2004); Longway v. AutoNation, Inc.,
No. G031934, 2004 WL 206602, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2004); Whalen-Camacho v. GMRI, Inc.,
No. H031367, 2004 WL 569256, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2004); Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 120 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1288 (2004); Castillo v. Dollar Financial Group, No. G033184, 2004
WL 2191551, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2004); Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., 118 Cal. App.
4th 107, 119 (2004); Harper v. Ultimo, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1412 (2003); Ho v. Knox Assocs., Inc.,
No. G030477, 2003 WL 22422391, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2003); Torigian v. Michael Cadillac,
Inc., No. F039900, 2003 WL 21246609, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 29, 2003); Pitzen v. Veritas Software
Corp., No. A100181, 2003 WL 22026623, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003); Jaramillo v. JH Real
Estate Partners, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 4th 394, 406 (2003); Wilson v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., No.
D039355, 2003 WL 21398324, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2003); Canales v. Performance Team
Triangle West, No. B155659, 2003 WL 361242, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2003); Bylund v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. B153167, 2002 WL 31744919, *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2002);
O'Hare v. Municipal Res. Consultants, 107 Cal. App. 4th 267, 284 (2003); Harvey v. Katella
Mobilehome Estates, L.P., No. G031737, 2003 WL 22436265, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2003);
McKinney v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., No. B153720, 2002 WL 1824963, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
8, 2002); Hendrix v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. B153848, 2002 WL 1584244, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 17, 2002); Packin v. Astra USA, Inc., No. G023345, 2002 WL 120563, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 2002); Meriwether v. Gemini Assocs., Inc., No. G027921, 2002 WL 1161596, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 31, 2002); Dung v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., No. B152629, 2002 WL 984800, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 14, 2002); Ritchotte v. Nissan, No. B144965, 2002 WL 533219, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 10,
2002); Mercuro v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal. App. 4th 167, 187 (2002); Fischer v. Families For Children, Inc.,
No. C037383, 2002 WL 171240, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2002); Flores v. TransAmerica Homefirst,
Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 856-59 (2002); Katherman v. Den 104, L.L.C., No. E028869, 2001 WL
1191454, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2001); McCoy v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. App. 4th 354, 363 (2001);
Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 76 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1237 (2000); Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft
Employees Federal Credit Union, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 768 (1999); Kinney v. United Healthcare
Servs., Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1332 (1999); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1552
(1997).
62. See infra notes 63-66.
63. McNaughton v. United Health Care Servs., 728 So.2d 592, 599 (Ala. 1999) (citing Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Cassarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
64. Gray v. Conseco, Inc., No. 00-322, 2000 WL 1480273, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000) (citing
as examples Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Pate, 198 B.R.
841, 844 (S.D. Ga. 1996); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Wampler, 749 So.2d 409, 416 (Ala. 1999); Lackey
v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 330 S.C. 388, 398-402 (1998).
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long as there is consideration on both sides."65 "If there is consideration for
the entire agreement that is sufficient; the consideration supports the
arbitration option, as it does every other obligation in the agreement.,
66
Second, a contrary rule would place a unique burden on agreements to
arbitrate and therefore would conflict with the FAA. 67  The Armendariz
decision itself has been criticized by at least one California federal court:
"Under California law, other non-mutual provisions are valid and not
unconscionable. The language used by the California Supreme Court in the
Armendariz opinion itself demonstrates that the rule singles out and
imposes a special burden on arbitration agreements .... ,68
Whether the principle of mutuality is generally a sound contract law
doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. If mutuality of obligation were
a basic requirement for all contracts in California, there would likely be no
conflict with the FAA. However, as in fact applied by California courts,
the mutuality test violates the FAA because: (1) it is an arbitration-specific
test premised on the inferiority of arbitration as compared with litigation;
and (2) it provides a basis for finding substantive unconscionability-lack
of mutuality-that is substantially different in kind from the basis used to
support substantive unconscionability findings for ordinary contractual
provisions.
1. THE MUTUALITY TEST IS AN ARBITRATION-SPECIFIC TEST PREMISED
ON THE INFERIORITY OF ARBITRATION
Outside of the arbitration context, California law does not require
mutuality of obligation as a precondition to enforcement of contracts.
69
Nevertheless, the court in Armendariz insisted that the mutuality test does
not single out and impose a heightened burden on arbitration agreements:
The ordinary principles of unconscionability may manifest themselves in
forms peculiar to the arbitration context. One such form is an agreement
requiring arbitration only for the claims of the weaker party but a choice
of forums for the claims of the stronger party. The application of this
principle does not disfavor arbitration. It is no disparagement of
arbitration to acknowledge that it has both advantages and
65. Gray, 2000 WL 1480273, at *4; see also Wilson Elec. Contractors, Inc., v. Minnotte Contracting
Corp., 878 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Because the contract as a whole did not lack consideration,
we see no grounds justifying the district court's decision, which appears to be pervaded by the 'the old
judicial hostility to arbitration."').
66. Sablosky v. Gordon Comp., Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 137 (N.Y. 1989).
67. See, e.g., Gray, 2000 WL 1480273, at *4; McNaughton, 728 So.2d at 598.
68. Gray, 2000 WL 1480273, at *4 (citation omitted).
69. See Principal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vars, Pave, McCord & Freedman, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1469, 1488
(1998) (holding mortgage agreement provision enforceable despite unilateral nature and noting that
"where sufficient consideration is present, mutuality is not essential"); Hillsman v. Sutter Cmty. Hosp.,
153 Cal. App. 3d 743, 752 (1984) (holding employment contract enforceable despite unilateral nature if
consideration requirement is properly met and noting that "mutuality of obligation" is unnecessary).
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disadvantages. 70
The court acknowledged that lack of mutuality is not normally
problematic, but maintained that "in the context of an arbitration agreement
imposed by the employer on the employee, such a one-sided term is
unconscionable.'
While a typical unconscionability analysis requires a court to assess
whether an agreement is so one-sided as to "shock the conscience,,
72
California courts have indicated that, in the arbitration setting, this standard
is satisfied per se where the plaintiff demonstrates that an arbitration
agreement lacks mutuality.73 The mutuality test does not require a case-by-
case evaluation of the strengths or weaknesses of the arbitral forum
contemplated by the particular agreement. Under California jurisprudence
the party seeking to avoid arbitration need not show, for example, that the
particular forum is impartial or provides for unreasonably limited discovery
or excessive arbitration costs. The California courts assume under the
mutuality test that the agreement is substantively unconscionable if one
party's claims are subject to arbitration while the other party's claims may
be litigated. As the Court of Appeal stated in Ramirez v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., "It is by now well-settled that an agreement that requires the
weaker party to arbitrate any claims he or she may have, but permits the
stronger party to seek redress through the courts, is presumptively
unconscionable."74 Although there is language in Armendariz that suggests
that lack of mutuality can be justified by "business realities, ' 75 no lower
court has yet identified a business reality sufficient to justify lack of
mutuality in an arbitration agreement.76
The fact that no substantive inquiry of the particular arbitral forum is
necessary is evidence of the assumption underlying the mutuality test-that
arbitration is inferior to litigation as a means of dispute resolution. Under
the mutuality test, the courts assume that being required to arbitrate is
always a disadvantage-no matter the character of the particular forum-
because of the inherent limitations of arbitration. The California Supreme
Court revealed its bias in Armendariz, stating, "Given the disadvantages
that may exist for plaintiffs arbitrating disputes, it is unfairly one-sided for
an employer with superior bargaining power to impose arbitration on the
employee as plaintiff but not to accept such limitations when it seeks to
70. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 119 (2000).
71. Id. at 117.
72. Hicks v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 77, 93 (2004) ("To be substantively unconscionable, a
contractual provision must shock the conscience."), review granted, 89 P.3d 732 (Cal. 2004), appeal
dismissed per stipulation 129 P.3d 321 (Cal. 2006).
73. See infra note 74.
74. Ramirez v. Circuit City Stores, 76 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1235 (2000).
75. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 117.
76. McGuinness & Karr, supra note 6, at 81.
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prosecute a claim against the employee .... ,7 If a court assumes
arbitration is inferior to litigation, it is easy to see why it would then view a
unilateral agreement to arbitrate as unfair. The problem, of course, is that
the FAA prohibits the courts from making such an assumption.78
It is noteworthy that the assumption underlying the mutuality test
creates a significant burden-shifting effect. Normally, the burden of
proving unconscionability rests on the party challenging the agreement.79
Under the mutuality test, by contrast, a unilateral agreement to arbitrate is
presumed to be unconscionable unless the party seeking to compel
arbitration can identify a legitimate business justification for the
arrangement. As of yet, there is no case where this burden has been
satisfied.8"
In sum, the mutuality test disfavors arbitration agreements and
significantly increases the ability of a party to avoid arbitration. As an
arbitration-specific requirement premised on the inferiority of arbitration in
relation to litigation, the mutuality test clearly violates section 2 of the
FAA.
2. LACK OF MUTUALITY IS DIFFERENT IN KIND FROM THE BASIS USED
TO FIND ORDINARY CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS UNCONSCIONABLE
Contract terms, other than arbitration clauses, are rarely held to be
unconscionable. A Westlaw search reveals only five such cases in the
California Courts of Appeal.81 The dearth of such cases is explained by the
fact that the basis for a substantive unconscionability finding is normally
limited to contractual terms that are: (1) clearly included in the contract by
the superior bargaining party in an attempt to appropriate from the weaker
party something of substantial economic value; and (2) not justified by any
legitimate business interest of the superior bargaining party. 2 Courts
identify an unfair and unjustified impairment of the weaker party's
77. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th 83 at 117 (emphasis added).
78. See De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 487 (1989) ("The act of replacing an
employee's access to the courts for airing employment-related disputes with access to an arbitral forum,
provided it appears unfair and impartial, cannot be viewed as a penalty or the like.").
79. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWIRTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2 ed. 2001). See also
Woodside Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 107 Cal. App. 4th 723, 727-28 (2003) ("The party asserting
unconscionability as defense has the burden of establishing that condition."); In re First Merit Bank,
N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. 2001) ("[S]ince the law favors arbitration, the burden of proving a
defense to arbitration is on the party opposing arbitration.").
80. See McGuiness & Karr, supra note 6, at 81.
81. See Johnisee v. Kimberlite Corp., No. A107341, 2005 WL 1249198, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May
24, 2005); see Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Johnson, No. A089871, 2001 WL 1324778, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 29, 2001); see Ilkhchooyi v. Best, 37 Cal. App. 4th 395, 412 (1995); see Ellis v. McKinnon
Broadcasting Co., 18 Cal. App. 4th 1796, 1807 (1993); see Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. App. 4th 76, 87
(1991).
82. See Carboni, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 82-83.
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substantive economic rights, and it is upon this finding that
unconscionability is based. Because mutually agreed upon contracts are
generally presumed to be valid, the party asserting an unconscionability
challenge normally has a substantial burden in establishing that the term is
unfair and unjustified. As research reveals, this burden is rarely satisfied.
A brief description of the contracts in the five successful non-
arbitration unconscionability challenges will help illustrate the distinction
between the normal basis for substantive unconscionability and lack of
mutuality.
In Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Johnson, the loan agreement at issue
included a default term that permitted the lender both to accelerate
payments upon default, and to include in the amortization all the interest
payments that the lender would have been entitled to if the loan had been
paid out over the full term. 3 Experts testified at trial that when a loan is
accelerated, the borrower does not have the use of the money for the
duration of the loan term and therefore the lender does not earn the interest.
The court found that Phoenix had no legitimate business interest in
receiving the approximately $208,000 of unearned interest and accordingly
that the amortization provision was substantively unconscionable. 4
In Ilkhchooyi v. Best, the plaintiff was duped into signing a lease
agreement that entitled the landlord, upon assignment of the lease, to three
quarters of any consideration the tenant received for promising not to
compete with the sub-lessee." When plaintiff sold his business and
assigned the lease to the buyer, the sales contract stipulated that $40,000 of
the sales price would be allocated as consideration for a covenant not to
compete. 6 The landlord claimed $30,000 under the terms of the lease and
refused to assent to the assignment until that sum was paid. 7 The court
noted that the lease afforded the landlord the right to refuse to consent to
the assignment, and if the landlord did consent, to increase the rent to
market value. 8 The landlord's legitimate interest in the possible escalation
in market rent was amply protected by the consent-to-assignment
provision. 9 Therefore, the landlord's "attempt to appropriate a portion of
the sales price for the business was blatant overreaching."9 °
In Carboni v. Arrospide, Arrospide signed a $4000 note in favor of
Carboni that carried an interest rate of 200% per annum, was due in three
83. Phoenix Leasing Inc., 2001 WL 1324778, at *2.
84. Id. at *6.
85. Ilkhchooyi, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 401.
86. Id. at 402.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 775.
89. Id. at 411.
90. Id.
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months, and was secured by a deed of trust on a residence which had an
unencumbered value of $57,000.91 Over the next four months, Carboni
continued to make cash advances to Arrospide that were secured by the
original note and deed of trust.92 Ultimately, the principal amount of the
note grew to $99,346, all of which carried an interest rate of 200% per
annum. 93 By the time of trial, the principal and accumulated interest was
approximately $390,000. 94 The court found that Carboni had no legitimate
business interest in a 200% interest rate, which was ten times the prevailing
market rate for similar loans.95 The court stated, "We have little trouble
concluding that an interest rate of 200% on a secured $99,000 loan is
substantively unconscionable. 96
In Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co., an advertising account
executive's sole compensation was the twenty percent commission he
earned on advertising sales. 97 Ellis signed an employment contract that
stipulated he would not receive commissions on fees collected by the
employer after Ellis' final date of actual employment.98 When Ellis
voluntarily terminated his employment, the employer collected $100,000 in
fees generated from Ellis' earlier work.99 Ellis claimed that the contract
was unconscionable and that he was entitled to $20,000 worth of
commissions.1"' The court found that to the extent the disputed provision
was included in the employer's contracts to account for the post-sale
services employees would normally render, the employment contract could
instead include a percentage deduction on uncompleted contracts. 1 ' As
written, the court found the provision to be "a commercially unreasonable
forfeiture clause, exacting a penalty far in excess of any potential detriment
suffered by [the employer]. '' °2
Finally, in Johnisee v. Kimberlite Corp., the court considered a
forfeiture clause similar to the clause in Ellis.'13 The court found that to the
extent the forfeiture clause deprived former employees of all their
commissions on sales not collected before the employee's date of departure
(as opposed to merely a deduction for post-sale services that would not be
91. Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. App. 4th 76, 79 (1991).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 849.
96. Id.
97. Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co., 18 Cal. App. 4th 1796, 1801 (1993).
98. Id. at 82.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1806 n.4.
102. Id. at 1807.
103. Johnisee v. Kimberlite Corp., No. A107341, 2005 WL 1249198, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24,
2005).
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rendered), the provision was unconscionable.' °4 The court stated, "[The
employer] reaps the benefit of the sales consultant's legwork and
persistence in obtaining a customer-who is, after all, the indispensable
threshold element for providing revenue to the company-without having
to compensate the sales consultant who did so on its behalf."'
0 5
These five cases provide good examples of unconscionable provisions
that truly "shock the conscience.' ' 6  Under normal circumstances,
contractual terms are substantively unconscionable only when they
constitute an unfair and unjustified burden on the inferior party's
substantive economic rights. Under the mutuality test, by contrast,
unconscionability is not based on actual impairment of substantive rights.
Rather, the test focuses on the restriction of procedural rights-the inability
of one party to pursue its claim in court. The California courts presume
that the procedural limitation will have substantive consequences, and the
unconscionability finding is based on this presumption." 7 This is surely a
more tenuous basis for unconscionability than is normally required.
While it may be true that in some cases the arbitration requirement
may result in an unfair benefit that inures to the superior bargaining party, a
categorical approach that assumes this is always the case is both erroneous
and contrary to the FAA. Whatever "disadvantages" or "limitations" are
inherent in arbitration,' they will be faced by both parties to any arbitrated
dispute. In some cases, these disadvantages and limitations may inure to
the benefit of the superior bargaining party; in other cases to the inferior
bargaining party. But there is no reliable way to tell at the outset whether
arbitration will work a hardship to either party. Even if there is a way to
come close to making such a determination, it would at minimum require a
case-by-case analysis to determine whether, for a party's particular claim,
the particular arbitral forum would work a hardship- to that party. As
discussed above,0 9 the California courts do not engage in such case-by-
case analysis when using the mutuality test.
Under the mutuality test, substantive unconscionability can never be
based on more than mere speculation about the possible disadvantages of
arbitration. This is because the California courts' approach to arbitration
agreements focuses on the means used to settle the dispute, rather than the
substance of the claim. However, "arbitration affects only the choice of
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id.
106. Hicks v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. App. 4th 77, 93 (2004), review granted, 89 P.3d 732 (Cal. 2004),
appeal dismissed per stipulation 129 P.3d 321 (Cal. 2006).
107. As stated in the previous section, a test that presumes that arbitration will invariably result in
inferior outcomes is clearly inconsistent with the FAA. See supra Part [V.A.
108. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 117 (2000).
109. See supra Part [V.A.
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forum, not substantive rights."11 A party asserting a claim against his
employer, for example, does not seek as his ultimate redress arbitration or a
court proceeding; he seeks legal or equitable relief for his injury."' He
uses the proceeding simply as a means to obtain that result."2 Rather than
suffering unconscionable treatment, "by agreeing to arbitrate, a party
'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.""' 3 A party does not
suffer an injury merely because he is required to arbitrate his claim, for he
may obtain through arbitration exactly the relief he requests.
Thus, the basis for substantive unconscionability under the mutuality
test is different in kind from that under the standard employed to analyze
the unconscionability of ordinary contractual provisions. For ordinary
contractual provisions, unconscionability is invariably based on an
unjustified impairment of substantive economic rights (e.g., the right to the
commissions earned from one's own labors, the right to retain the proceeds
of the sale of one's own business). Under the mutuality test, by contrast,
speculation that the arbitral forum might impede a party's ability to obtain
the requested relief is sufficient.
B. PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY
Procedural unconscionability focuses on two factors: "oppression"
and "surprise."'' 4  Although often presented in the conjunctive,' 15
oppression and surprise are alternative prongs for satisfying the procedural
element.16 Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power
which results in the absence of meaningful negotiation and choice; surprise
arises when the purportedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in
a prolix, printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed
110. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n.10 (2002)).
111. See Young v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., I 10 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
112. SeeId.
113. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
114. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473,486 (1982).
115. See, e.g., Robison v. City of Manteca, 78 Cal. App. 4th 452, 458 (2000); Eagle High Reach
Equip., Inc. v. Precision Drywall, Inc., No. B163833, 2004 WL 938428, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. May 3,
2004).
116. See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000) (stating that
procedural unconscionability focuses on oppression "or" surprise due to unequal bargaining power, and
finding arbitration agreement unconscionable despite absence of any element of surprise); see also
Wilkins v. Weber Motors Fresno, Inc., No. F045545, 2005 WL 1941273, *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15,
2005); Vlahos v. Int'l Baking Co., No.A102335, 2005 WL 1632089, at *8-9 (Cal. Ct. App. July 12,
2005); McLemore v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. A106373, 2005 WL 1634981, at *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App.
July 13, 2005).
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terms. 117
An adhesion contract is a standardized form contract, drafted and
imposed by the superior bargaining party, that "relegates to the subscribing
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.""18
Ordinarily, the fact of adhesion is not sufficient to satisfy the standard for
procedural unconscionability." 9  In the non-arbitration setting, courts
everywhere, including in California, seek to discover in the circumstances
surrounding the signing of the contract the presence or absence of facts
indicating oppression or surprise. In addition to demonstrating that the
contract at issue is one of adhesion, a party is required to show that they
had no reasonable option but to consent to the agreement as written (for
example, if the party could not obtain the goods, services or employment
from another company),' or that deceptive tactics were used to prevent the
party from discovering the disputed term before signing the contract.'
This additional burden is significant and, as discussed below, in the non-
arbitration context adhesion contracts are frequently held not to be
procedurally unconscionable."2 For arbitration agreements, by contrast,
adhesion alone is enough to satisfy the California courts that the agreement
is procedurally unconscionable.
1. PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE ARBITRATION CONTEXT
When the California courts evaluate an arbitration agreement, the fact
that the agreement is contained in a contract of adhesion is sufficient to
establish procedural unconscionability. For example, when an arbitration
clause is contained in a standard, pre-printed employment contract, the
California courts have said that procedural unconscionability is "easily
established."'23 The court stated in Wilson v. Balley Total Fitness Corp.,
"[t]he fact that [an] [a]greement is an adhesion contract is sufficient to
establish that the [a]greement is procedurally unconscionable and there is
no need for [the party challenging an arbitration agreement] to present
117. A&M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486.
118. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694 (1961).
119. See infra notes 132, 139, 144-154 and accompanying text; Gray v. Conseco, Inc., No. 00-322,
2000 WL 1480273, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000).
120. See infra notes 148, 150 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 132, 139, 144-154 and accompanying text.
123. Wilkins v. Weber Motors Fresno, Inc., No. F045545, 2005 WL 1941273, *10 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 15, 2005) ("Procedural unconscionability is easily established where an employee is required to
arbitrate employment disputes as a condition of employment.").
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evidence showing that she attempted to negotiate the arbitration
requirement or other terms of the agreement.'
24
It is now the norm for standardized employment contracts to contain
an arbitration agreement.12 5 Under the California approach, it appears that
all of those agreements are procedurally unconscionable, irrespective of the
particular circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement. This
approach appears to run counter to the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., that "[m]ere inequality in
bargaining power.., is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context. 126
Admittedly, when the arbitration provision at issue is in an
employment agreement, there is an additional consideration that might
affect the procedural unconscionability analysis: The employee may fear
that rejection of the contract will mean unemployment. But this does not
appear to be an important consideration in the California courts' procedural
unconscionability analysis, as commercial arbitration clauses also have
been condemned based on the mere adhesive nature of the contract. 27 The
Court of Appeal stated in a commercial arbitration agreement case that "[a]
finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural
unconscionability. 1 2' This categorical approach makes even less sense in
the commercial context, since the inferior party is not susceptible to the
same economic pressures as they are in the employment context. In the
commercial context, the consumer purchasing discretionary goods or
services can simply choose to buy from another vendor in order to obtain
more favorable terms of contract, or the consumer can forgo the good or
service if they are not amenable to the contract's terms.
124. Wilson v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., No. D039355, 2003 WL 21398324, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 18, 2003).
125. See Shimabukuro, supra note 8, at 1.
126. 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals of New York, that state's
highest court, noted that "almost all employment contracts are prepared by the employer; that
circumstance cannot render the arbitration clause contained in the contract unconscionable." Sablosky
v. Gordon Comp., Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 139 (N.Y. 1989).
127. See Bucy v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., No. A105910, 2005 WL 1168371, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 18, 2005) (arbitration provision in cell-phone service agreement found to be procedurally
unconscionable simply because it was contained in an adhesion contract); Torigian v. Michael Cadillac,
Inc., No. F039900, 2003 WL 21246609, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. May 29, 2003) (arbitration provision in
automobile sales contract found to be procedurally unconscionable simply because it was
"unmistakably [a] contract of adhesion."); Wing v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. A 105906, 2005 WL
2417640, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2005) ("We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the
wireless service agreement was a contract of adhesion and, hence, procedurally unconscionable.");
Flores v. TransAmerica Homefirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 856-59 (2002) ("The arbitration
agreement [in the loan agreement] was a contract of adhesion and thereby procedurally
unconscionable.").
128. Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th at 853.
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Nevertheless, in California, in both the employment and the
commercial context, adhesive arbitration agreements are procedurally
unconscionable per se.
2. PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ORDINARY CONTRACT
TERMS
California courts do not, however, view all clauses in adhesive
employment contracts as procedurally unconscionable per se. When the
adhesive contract clause at issue is anything other than an agreement to
arbitrate, California courts apply a demanding test to determine procedural
unconscionability. For example, in Robison v. City of Manteca, the Court
of Appeal found that a standardized "recovery agreement" form was not
procedurally unconscionable even though the agreement bore strong
characteristics of a contract of adhesion. 29 The agreement was presented
to the employee on a "take it leave it" basis, required that he undertake a
substance-abuse recovery plan, and required him to waive his right to
appeal any disciplinary action taken against him by the employer, including
termination.3 The court concluded that the agreement was not
procedurally unconscionable even though management "coerced him into
executing [the agreement]" and "on the date of execution, they did not
advise him to seek counsel, they did not review the document's provisions,
and they presented it to him turned to the signature page.' 131
The Court of Appeal stated that procedural unconscionability
"requires an inequality in bargaining power accompanied by a lack of
disclosure of material provisions. '  The court found that plaintiffs claim
of procedural unconscionability failed based on the mere fact that it was
not persuaded by plaintiffs allegations of surprise. 33 The standard for
surprise was notably high. Despite the fact that the provisions were not
reviewed with plaintiff and the agreement was presented to him open to the
signature page, the court nevertheless stated that "there is no allegation he
was prevented from reading the agreement on the day of the execution,
only that it was open to the signature page.'1
34
Similarly, in Cabral v. YMCA of Redlands, the Court of Appeal
enforced a provision in an employee handbook against an
unconscionability challenge even though the employees were told that they
were required to sign the acknowledgment when the handbooks were
129. Robison v. City of Manteca, 78 Cal. App. 4th 452, 454 (2000).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 754.
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distributed and that their jobs were in jeopardy if they failed to do so. 135
The Court of Appeal stated, "Although it is undoubtedly true that
employers generally have superior bargaining power to employees, there is
often room for some employees to negotiate over some terms."'36  The
court stated that one would expect that a request from Cabral, a 21-year
employee in a senior management position, would be seriously entertained
if not ultimately successful. 37  The court also noted that there was no
evidence that Cabral or any other employee attempted to negotiate the
terms of the agreement and was rebuffed. 38  By comparison, in the
employment contract cases where an arbitration provision was challenged
as procedurally unconscionable, evidence of attempted negotiation was not
necessary. Recall the Court of Appeal's statement in Wilson, a case where
an employee challenged an arbitration provision in a standardized
employment agreement: "an adhesion contract is sufficient to establish
procedural unconscionability and there is no need for [the employee] to
present evidence showing that she attempted to negotiate the arbitration
requirement or other terms of the agreement.'
139
Outside of the employment context, procedural unconscionability is
similarly difficult to establish when the challenged provision is something
other than an arbitration agreement. Recall that the Court of Appeal stated
in a commercial arbitration case that "[a] finding of a contract of adhesion
is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability."' 140  Before
procedural unconscionability can be established in the non-arbitration
setting, however, the California courts require that plaintiffs demonstrate
that the contract was for something of necessity, 14 and that after attempting
to negotiate they were left with no option but to agree to the challenged
provision. 141
For example, in AAA 1 R V Center, Inc. v. Nova Information Systems,
the Court of Appeal found that a pre-printed form contract was not
135. Robison, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 4 55.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Wilson v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., No. D039355, 2003 WL 21398324, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 18, 2003).
140. Flores v. TransAmerica Homefirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (2002).
141. See, e.g., Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11l Cal. App. 4th 660, 670 (2003) (finding an
absence of procedural unconscionability where plaintiff could have simply not purchased the shopping
card to avoid the cardholder terms of agreement); see Olsen v. Breeze, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 4th 608, 621
(1996) (despite the fact that the waiver provisions in the ski equipment service agreement were industry
standard and could not be avoided by taking business elsewhere, the court found no procedural
unconscionability because the plaintiff did not need to ski).
142. See, e.g., Greenbriar Homes Cmtys., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 4th 337, 345 (2004);
Eagle High Reach Equip., Inc. v. Precision Drywall, Inc., No. B 163833, 2004 WL 938428, at *3 (Cal.
Ct. App. May 3, 2004).
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procedurally unconscionable because, although there was no evidence the
terms were ever negotiated, there was also "no evidence that appellants
were forced to enter the contract with Nova." '143 The court also noted that
no evidence was presented that appellants sought to negotiate the term.144
In Eagle High Reach Equipment, Inc. v. Precision Drywall Inc., the
Court of Appeal found that an equipment lease agreement appearing in
relatively small type on a standardized pre-printed form lacked the requisite
elements of oppression and surprise. 145  The court stated there was no
indication that this was an oppressive situation since Precision could have
dealt with other lessors as it had done on other occasions. 146 There was no
consideration of whether the challenged term was standard in the industry.
In Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., terms printed on the back of a
shopping card (a store credit card) were held to not be procedurally
unconscionable because "plaintiff was not subjected to a take-it-or-leave-it
situation in which there was no reasonable alternative but to accept the
shopping card terms.... Plaintiff could simply decline to purchase a
shopping card and make purchases by other means."'
147
In Gary Drilling Co. v. Onesta Corp., where an oil well driller brought
an action against an operator for breach of contract, alleging failure to pay,
and where the operator contended that the contract was unconscionable, the
Court of Appeal declined to find procedural unconscionability, stating:
Onesta did not have to contract with Gary Drilling. Onesta contracted
with at least two other drilling contractors for the drilling of other wells.
Presumably it chose to contract with Gary Drilling because it thought it
could get a better price, better service, or both from Gary Drilling .... 148
In Olsen v. Breeze Inc., where a skier brought suit challenging a
release of liability he was required to sign as a condition for obtaining
143. AAA 1 RV Ctr., v. Inc., Nova Info. Sys., Inc., No. B 168213, 2004 WL 2809898, at *6 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 8, 2004).
144. Id.
145. Eagle High Reach Equip., Inc., 2004 WL 938428, at *3.
146. Id.
147. See Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 4th 660, 670 (2003). See also Greenbriar
Homes Cmtys., 117 Cal. App. 4th at 345 (holding that a judicial reference provision contained in a
standardized sale agreement that was used in the sale of sixty-nine homes in a development was not
procedurally unconscionable because there was no evidence the purchasers "attempted to negotiate the
provision and were rebuffed"); see Woodside Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 4th 723,
729 (2003) (finding a judicial reference provision in a standardized home sale contract to constitute an
insufficient level of procedural unconscionability because purchaser plaintiffs did not allege that any of
the purchasers disagreed with or attempted to reject the provision); see Contreras v. Children's Hosp. of
Los Angeles, No. B156810, 2003 WL 21328937, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. June 10, 2003) ("[Plaintiff] was
not in a 'take it or leave it' situation.... [Plaintiff] could choose to reject the admission document by
taking her business to another dentist.").
148. Gary Drilling Co. v. Onesta Corp., No. F038807, 2003 WL 178867, at *8 (Cal. App. Jan. 27,
2003).
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service on ski bindings, the Court of Appeal held that "consumers are not
denied a meaningful choice by virtue of the common use of the releases.
Their choice to ski already exposes them to a number of risks inherent in
that activity."'
149
Cases like Olsen demonstrate the substantial burden a plaintiff bears
in establishing procedural unconscionability when an ordinary contract is at
issue. There the court recognized that the disputed release terms were
industry standard and that the plaintiff could not obtain the services he
sought elsewhere without having to sign an identical release form. 5°
Nevertheless, the court found a lack of procedural unconscionability
because Olsen could have chosen not to ski. 5' Similarly, in Freeman, the
adhesive nature of the contract was found not to be procedurally
unconscionable because Freeman could have avoided the contract terms
simply by not buying the card.'
This attitude of the Courts of Appeal in non-arbitration cases contrasts
with arbitration cases such as Bucy v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., where
an arbitration agreement in a cell phone service contract was challenged.5 3
There the court found the mere fact that the provision was in an adhesion
contract was sufficient to establish procedural unconscionability. 154 The
Bucy court did not require the plaintiff to demonstrate that he could not
obtain a cell phone service plan without an arbitration provision from
another provider, nor that he sought to negotiate terms but was denied.'
Nor did the court acknowledge that in order to avoid the terms of the
contract, the plaintiff could simply have opted not to buy a cell phone
service plan. 5 6 The adhesive form contract was sufficient.'57
3. PROCEDURAL UNCONSCIONABILITY SUMMARY
The California Courts of Appeal clearly have established a lower
burden for demonstrating procedural unconscionability when the
challenged term is an arbitration provision. The courts have adopted a per
se rule that adhesive arbitration agreements satisfy the procedural
unconscionability requirement. The courts are more reluctant to find
procedural unconscionability when the contractual provision challenged is
something other than an arbitration agreement. In the non-arbitration
149. Olsen v. Breeze, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 4th 608, 621 (1996).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Freeman, 111 Cal. App. 4th at 670.
153. Bucy v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., No. A105910, 2005 WL 1168371, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 18, 2005).
154. Id.
155. Id. at *9.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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context the courts engage in a more substantive, fact-based analysis to
determine whether plaintiff has met her burden. Courts often require
plaintiffs to show that they sought to negotiate the disputed term but were
unsuccessful, or that plaintiffs could not have obtained the products,
services, or employment they sought from another provider or employer
without agreeing to the disputed term. Plaintiffs challenging an arbitration
agreement bear no such burden.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite clear direction from Congress and the Supreme Court to treat
arbitration agreements no less favorably than ordinary contractual terms,
the California courts continue to view arbitration agreements as a "lesser
caste"' 55 of contract provision to be ignored whenever the court suspects
one party may be disadvantaged by having to arbitrate its claims. The
courts have attempted to cloak their bias in the generally applicable
contract defense of unconscionability, thereby invoking the savings clause
in section 2 and purportedly complying with the FAA. However, a review
of California unconscionability jurisprudence reveals that
"unconscionable" means something quite different when the validity of an
arbitration agreement is at issue.
The mutuality test, in addition to evidencing the disfavor with which
the California courts view arbitration, supplies a lower standard for
establishing substantive unconscionability in the arbitration context. In the
five cases in which the California courts voided an ordinary contract term
as unconscionable, the disputed term was clearly conscience-shocking and
imposed a concrete and unreasonable hardship on the inferior bargaining
party. Under the mutuality test, by contrast, mere speculation that the
inferior party might be disadvantaged by having to arbitrate its claims is a
sufficient basis for substantive unconscionability.
The California courts have similarly distorted the procedural prong of
the unconscionability test in the arbitration cases. Under the lower
standards established by the Courts of Appeal, without engaging in case-
by-case analysis one can confidently predict that millions of arbitration
clauses in existence in California today, incorporated in standardized
commercial and employment contracts, would be found to be procedurally
unconscionable if challenged. In California, arbitration provisions in
adhesive form contracts are procedurally unconscionable per se. Ordinary
contractual provisions are treated differently. Indeed, the mere fact that an
ordinary contract term is contained in an adhesion contract has been
considered insufficient to establish procedural unconscionability.159
158. See Stipanowich, supra note 11, at 6.
159. See, e.g., Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 4th 660, 670 (2003); Olsen v.
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This Article demonstrates that the standard for establishing
unconscionability is more easily satisfied when the contractual term being
challenged is an arbitration agreement. An empirical review reveals that
unconscionability challenges succeed with far greater frequency when the
disputed term is an arbitration provision.16° Through both empirical and
substantive analysis, therefore, the cloak of the "generally applicable"
contract defense of unconscionability is removed, and these unique
standards and requirements are revealed for what they really are:
manifestations of the California courts' ingrained bias against arbitration as
an alternative to the judicial forum. Despite the disfavor with which the
California courts view arbitration, their current approach is preempted by
the FAA. 6'
Breeze, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 4th 608, 622 (1996).
160. See discussion supra Part II.
161. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides: "The Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all the Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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